The sudden and wholly unexpected fall of France in 1940 was one of the most shocking events of modern times. So easily did German forces overrun the country that in retrospect it seemed almost self-evident that France was feeble or incompetently led or both. This book, which includes essays from young scholars as well as French experts whose work is little known outside France, places France's fall in the wider context of inter-war international relations. It challenges the conventional wisdom, which claims that the fall was inevitable, attributable to French pre-war decadence. Instead the collection shows that there is nothing simple or straight-forward about the French inter-war experience. Discussion ranges from the Treaty of Versailles and the International Steel Entente, to French propaganda and Franco-American relations in the 1930s. There are striking differences of emphasis and interpretation among the contributors and these serve to illustrate the challenge facing students of inter-war history in analysing the performance of France. The impact of this history is evident in current French policy and it remains a central issue for students of contemporary international relations, history and politics.